An international anomaly? Sovereignty, the League of Nations, and India's princely geographies by Legg, Stephen
at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Journal of Historical Geography 43 (2014) 96e110Contents lists availableJournal of Historical Geography
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/ jhgAn international anomaly? Sovereignty, the League of Nations and
India’s princely geographies
Stephen Legg
School of Geography, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United Kingdom
Abstract
This paper examines India’s experiences as the only non-self-governing member of the League of Nations as a means of addressing the broader question:
where was the international? As the only non-self-governing member of the League, India’s new international status exposed both its external, more
imperial, as well as its internal, more colonial, anomalies. This paper examines, ﬁrst, the Indian anomaly from the ‘inside out’, looking at India’s rep-
resentation and silencing at Geneva, and how Indian commentators assessed India’s external status in the League. Secondly, it considers the Indian
anomaly from the ‘outside in’, by exploring colonial tensions that the internationalism of the League provoked relating to India’s internal political
geography. The League posed taxing questions about the Government of India’s decision to exclude international law from the spaces between British and
Princely India, examined here through the example of trafﬁcking in women and children. In exploring India’s anomalous situation two broader
approaches are deployed. The ﬁrst is a scalar methodology, which shows how the concepts of the national and international operated at various scales,
with India’s burgeoning sense of nationhood taking one of its many shapes in the international sphere, while the internationalism of the League seeped
into the national ﬁssures between British and Princely India. Secondly, the paper approaches these questions through the lens of sovereignty. Moving
beyond associations with the juridical and the territorial, it explores sovereignty as: representational (diplomacy); governmental (administration),
theoretical (political philosophy), political (anti-colonialism), territorial (political geography) and contractual (international law).
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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World War, India secured a place at the 1919 Versailles Peace
Conference, which (unexpectedly) made it a founding member of
the League of Nations. The League itself is the subject of increasing
academic interest,1 which is moving beyond traditional areas of
concern such as international relations and the ‘problem of “secu-
rity”’, to ‘humanitarian and educational initiatives’, the role of
‘experts, ofﬁcials, lobbies and publics’, ‘the construction of rights
and identities’ and the ‘redrawing of empires, nations and regions’.2
In terms of the latter, India’s position was of especial interest. No
other non-self-governing state was allowed to join the League afterE-mail address: stephen.legg@nottingham.ac.uk
1 See S. Pedersen, Back to the League of Nations, American Historical Review 112 (2007)
2012.
2 These headings are taken from the ‘Towards a New History of the League of Nations’
in Geneva in August 2011, at which a version of this paper was presented. The conferenc
scholars now exists at: http://www.leagueofnationshistory.org/homepage.shtml. This exp
colonial critique: I. Borowy, Coming to Terms With World Health: The League of Nations He
The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920e1946, Oxford, 2013; J.P. Daughton, Behind
colonialism in the interwar years, French Historical Studies 34 (2011) 503e528.
0305-7488/$ e see front matter  2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhg.2013.03.002Versailles, making India a permanent anomaly in a membership of
otherwise free nation-states.
This paper will expose the troubling questions of scale and
sovereignty that India’s membership of the League provoked. In
terms of scale, the Indian nation started to take shape through its
international activities, while international concerns seeped into
national politics, provoking troubling tensions for the colonial
government. In terms of sovereignty, these interactions provoked
the fundamental question of whether India was even a state at all,
and raised the problem of the ‘quasi-sovereignty’ of the Princely
States. By tracing debates about sovereignty beyond the juridical1091e1117; M. Housden, The League of Nations and the Organization of Peace, London,
conference, held at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
e included 21 presented papers and 26 tabled papers; a research network of League
anding interest is reﬂected in recent works on the League and health, economy and
alth Organisation 1921e1946, Frankfurt, 2009; P. Clavin, Securing the World Economy:
the imperial curtain: international humanitarian efforts and the critique of French
S. Legg / Journal of Historical Geography 43 (2014) 96e110 97and the territorial this paper tracks the fundamentally geographical
and historical question: where was the international?3
The paper will proceed in two parts. The ﬁrst looks at India
‘inside out’, examining its representation abroad and the debates
within India about its external position, in terms of internation-
alism and India’s ‘imperial’ status. This is the scale at which India’s
anomalous nature has been mostly commented upon,4 but it is also
the scale at which most League members could claim to be
anomalous, given the newness of the League experiment and the
ruptured imperial and nation-state system across which it was
attempting the ‘organisation of peace’.5 The second section exam-
ines the subcontinent from the ‘outside in’, charting a lesser known
Indian anomaly, which raised more ‘colonial’ questions about ter-
ritory and the indirect rule of India’s Princely States (as opposed to
directly ruled British India). The League’s activities provoked
tensions between these two sovereign regimes, which will here be
examined through the lens of trafﬁcking in women and children
(TWC).
Trafﬁcking was an international concern which emerged in the
interwar period, especially through the activities of the League,6
augmenting previous concerns about the white slave trade, and
prostitutioneregulation policies which focused on the health of
colonial elites,7 with a concern for mobility, rights and human
dignity.8 In late-colonial India this development was clearly part of
a broader and ongoing negotiation of imperialism, gender and
sexuality.9 But trafﬁcking also ﬁtted into the ‘social and technical’
section of the League’s duties, which saw it move beyond peace-
keeping and international law to investigate economics, epidemics,
refugees, arms and opium trafﬁcking.10 The League could only
concern itself with the international elements of these topics, but in
this respect TWC is of special interest to the geographer.11 This sort
of trafﬁcking did not entail large shipments or bulky goods; a girl
or woman, often seemingly willing, could be easily concealed, or
openly ﬂaunted.12 But, most importantly, there was evidence of
‘trafﬁcking’ in India, but it was ‘regional’ trafﬁcking between states
of the Indian Empire. So deﬁned, it was beyond the a League of
Nations’ purview, but a 1933 draft of a League convention ques-
tioned this territorial deﬁnition of sovereignty by redeﬁning the
relationship between ‘protectorates’, ‘suzerainties’ and ‘colonies’.3 This question follows Miles Ogborn’s provocation to think ‘where was the eighteenth
discussion, Long Eighteenth Century Seminar Series, Institute of Historical Research, Un
4 See K.J. Schmidt, ‘An anomaly among anomalies’: India’s entry into the League of N
5 Housden, The League of Nations and the Organization of Peace (note 1).
6 D. Gorman, Empire, internationalism, and the campaign against the trafﬁc in wome
7 P. Howell, Geographies of Regulation: Policing Prostitution in Nineteenth-Century Britai
Venereal Disease in the British Empire, London, 2003.
8 B. Metzger, Towards an international human rights regime during the interwar years
(Eds), Beyond Sovereignty: Britain, Empire and Transnationalism, c.1880e1950, Basingstoke
9 M. Sinha, Specters of Mother India: The Global Restructuring of an Empire, Durham, 2
10 Pedersen, Back to the League of Nations (note 1); S. Legg, ‘The life of individuals a
governmentalities, Leiden Journal of International Law 25 (2012) 647e664.
11 Article 15, paragraph eight, of the League covenant stated that: ‘If the dispute betwee
matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party,
12 For contemporary considerations of this ‘underside of globalisation’ see G. Bhattach
13 M. Ogborn, Review: Lauren Benton. A search for sovereignty: law and geography in E
14 C. Flint, Political geography: globalization, metapolitical geographies and everyday l
15 M. Coleman, Sovereignty, in: N. Thrift, R. Kitchen (Eds), International Encyclopedia of H
Idea, Cambridge, 2007.
16 D. Strang, Contested sovereignty: the social construction of colonial imperialism, in: T
22e49.
17 D. Chakrabarty, ‘In the name of politics’: democracy and the power of the multitud
community and popular sovereignty see B. Yack, Popular sovereignty and nationalism, P
18 T.B. Hansen and F. Stepputat (Eds), Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in
19 F. McConnell, Sovereignty, in: K. Dodds et al. (Eds), The Ashgate Research Companion
duction: geographies of the nomos, in: S. Legg (Ed.), Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schm
20 M. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977e78, B
problematics of the ‘New World Order’ to the ethical problematics of the world order, AAs such, TWC brought issues of internationalist concern into the
cracks and ﬁssures between politically sovereign domestic units, as
the case of the indirectly ruled Princely States in India will high-
light. Trafﬁcking in women and children will, therefore, allow us to
consider India’s speciﬁcally anomalous status within the League of
Nations but, in so doing, will also provide insight into the afore-
mentioned concepts which have been explored, at great length, by
geographers and others, namely: sovereignty; imperialism; and
internationalism.Sovereignty, imperialism, internationalism and India
There has also been an. extensive rethinking of imperialcentury
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lternatipower and where we might look for it. The battle for empire
has seen military and economic might challenged by the
power of discourse, identity, and representation, then by
disciplinary power, biopolitics, and embodiment, and,
latterly, by increased attention to sovereignty.13The abstract notion of sovereignty as the ultimate authority over a
political community requires constant tailoring to its geographies,
exploringhowstate sovereignty is changingandhownewspatialities
of power negotiate ‘the push and pull of centripetal globalizing forces
and centrifugal forces of regionalism, separatism and nationalism’.14
Historical debates about the nature of sovereignty, whether depen-
dent on supreme command (constituted) or liberal, democratic au-
thority (constituent), also require tailoring to context, including that
of the colonial.15 Colonial sovereignties were hybrid and frequently
violated,16while thedomination at their core could be exposedby the
politics of anti-colonial nationalism.17 This made it clear that sover-
eignty is also exerted over bodies, symbols, money, and representa-
tions.18 Recent approaches to sovereignty have moved beyond the
readings of political philosophy and jurisprudence to engage with
geopolitics, discourse analysis, performativity, embodiment and
power.19 At a theoretical level, Foucault’s call to examine gov-
ernmentalities that triangulate disciplinary and governmental
power with sovereign powers still demands attention.20
One productive frame for approaching these provocations is
to think of ‘sovereignty regimes’ as combinations of central state’: M. Ogborn ‘Spatiality in the long eighteenth century’ contribution to panel
of London, 10th January 2001.
roceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians 1 (1993) 1e13.
hildren in the 1920s, Twentieth Century British History 19 (2008) 186e216.
e Empire, Cambridge, 2009; P. Levine, Prostitution, Race and Politics: Policing
ague of Nations’ combat of trafﬁc in women and children, in: K. Grant et al.
ork, 2007, 54e79.
s of nations’: international law and the League of Nations’ anti-trafﬁcking
rties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a
ncil shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement’.
rafﬁck: The Illicit Movement of People and Things, London, 2005.
empires, 1400e1900, American Historical Review 117 (2012) 814e816 [814].
ress in Human Geography 26 (2002) 391e400, 393.
eography, 2009, 255e261. Also see R. Jackson, Sovereignty: The Evolution of an
eker, C. Webber (Eds), State Sovereignty as Social Construct, Cambridge, 1996,
ia, Public Culture 19 (2007) 35e57. For a thorough exploration of national
Theory 29 (2001) 517e536.
colonial World, Princeton, Oxford, 2005.
cal Geopolitics, Aldershot, 2013, 109e128; S. Legg and A. Vasudevan, Intro-
graphies of the Nomos, London, 2011, 1e23.
oke, New York, 2007; M. Dillon, Sovereignty and governmentality: from the
ves 20 (1995) 323e368.
S. Legg / Journal of Historical Geography 43 (2014) 96e11098authority and political territoriality.21 This focus on effective sover-
eignty draws attention to authorities from both within and beyond
strict territorial state limits: ‘sovereigntydin the sense of the socially
constructed practices of political authoritydmay be exercised non-
territorially or in scattered pockets connected by ﬂows across space-
spanning networks’.22 This paper examines the Government of In-
dia’s grappling with sovereignty regimes that were imagined to be
below (the Princely States) and above (the League of Nations) its
domain of scalar sovereignty.23 The following cases will highlight
some of these many types of sovereignty (and their forms), namely:
representational (diplomacy); governmental (administration); theo-
retical (political philosophy); political (anti-colonialism); territorial
(political geography); and contractual (international law).24 These
types and forms constituted the ‘imperialist’ sovereignty regime that
Agnew has identiﬁed, and which is a deﬁning feature of current
postcolonial work on empires.25
Empires are currently being re-imagined, through postcolonial
and new imperial histories,26 as sovereign regimes with multiple
and overlapping scales and networks of authority.27 These span
divisions between formal and informal empires, imperial metro-
pole and colonial periphery, and norms and exceptions.28 The
complex geographies of these experimental sovereignty regimes
have been mapped by Benton’s magisterial survey of imperial ex-
periments with international law between 1400 and 1900.29 She
showed how imperial sovereignty expanded through corridors and
estuaries, negotiated hills and mountains, strung together islands
of martial experimentation, and incorporated enclaves of quasi-
sovereignty.30 Benton’s examples of the latter are the Princely
States that feature later in this paper, where her work will be
explored in greater depth. Nair has recently suggested that the
region might be the necessary scale at which to rethink Princely
modernity in India but it might also be a vital scale for thinking the
international within national borders.31 This study of the interwar
period extends Benton’s temporal scope to a period when imperial
sovereignty, federalism, and the ever-expanding networks of
globalisation were being debated.
These debates took place within a post-First World War enthu-
siasm for internationalism, the emergent phenomenon marked21 J. Agnew, Sovereignty regimes: territoriality and state authority in contemporary w
22 Agnew, Sovereignty regimes (note 21), 441.
23 S. Legg, Of scales, networks and assemblages: the League of Nations apparatus and th
Geographers 34 (2009) 234e253.
24 These categories draw on suggestions made by J.D. Sidaway, Sovereign excesses? Po
25 See K. Grant et al. (Eds), Beyond Sovereignty: Britain, Empire and Transnationalism, c.1
26 A. Burton (Ed.), After the Imperial Turn: Thinking With and Through the Nation, Durha
27 Legg, Of scales, networks and assemblages (note 23).
28 J. Onley, The Raj reconsidered: British India’s informal empire and spheres of inﬂuen
networks: geographies of the British Empire, History Compass 4 (2006) 124e141; P. Cha
2011, 9e10.
29 L. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires 1400e19
30 For a comparative reading, see S. Legg, Legal geographies and the state of imperialism
505e508.
31 J. Nair, Mysore Modern: Rethinking the Region under Princely Rule, Minneapolis, 2011
Margins of Empire, Comparative Studies in Society and History 55 (2013) 241e272 and B
Central India, 1818e1948, Modern Asian Studies 47 (2013) 288e317.
32 C. Navari, Internationalism and the State in the Twentieth Century, London, 2000; C. Sy
Britain, International Relations 21 (2007) 67e85.
33 T. Nairn, Internationalism and the second coming, Daedalus 122 (1993) 155e170, 16
34 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919e1939: An Introduction to the Study of Interna
35 M. Mazower, An international civilization? Empire, internationalism and the crisi
Inter-war spatial chaos? Imperialism, internationalism and the League of Nations, in: S. L
2011, 106e123.
36 S. Haynes, Alternative Vision: The United States, Latin America, and the League of Nati
37 Legg, Inter-war spatial chaos? (note 35).
38 E. Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-determination and the International Origins of
39 S. Subrahmanyam, The Political Economy of Commerce: Southern India 1500e1650, C
1860e1920, Berkeley, 2007; Onley, The Raj reconsidered (note 28).by increasingly dense diplomatic encounters, the growth of inter-
national institutions and international law, and the re-negotiation of
state sovereignty.32 In addition to shifts in practice, internationalism
was also a utopian aspiration that anticipated a more benign form
of cooperation between cohabitating (rather than competing) states.
As against imperialism and nationalism, the internationalist ethic
marked itself out by proposing an alternative vehicle of civilised
development.33 Yet E.H. Carr famously argued that such utopian
liberalism ignored the geopolitical realities of imperialism, exploi-
tation, and state formation in the interwar period.34 Others
demonstrated that the proposed international system was based
around an idea of European civilisation, thus reconstituting the
nomos of nineteenth-century international law but in a way which
allowed America to supplant Europe as global sovereign.35 As the
primary institutional manifestation of the internationalist utopian
spirit, all of the above criticisms of internationalismwere laid at the
League of Nations’ door. The conﬁguration of these criticisms very
much depended upon the national context from which they came.
Latin American countries constituted a third of the League’s member
states but railed against the lack of interest displayed by what
quickly came to be seen as a European organisation.36 In the heart of
Europe, however, others described the League as an occupying force,
colonising the defeated powers of the First World War under the
banner of a triumphant internationalism.37 Eric Manela has shown
how initial enthusiasm for Wilson’s concept of ‘self-determination’
in China, Korea, Egypt and India quickly failed as the racial delim-
itations of this term came to be understood.38 But India’s engage-
ment with the League, and it’s criticisms, outlasted the period of
Manela’s interest, and that of his other case studies, due to India’s
position as a non-self-governing, increasingly anti-colonial, member
of the League.
But India’s League of Nations membership did not mark the
beginning of its international biography; it followed, and depended
upon, an already growing international status. Pre-colonial India
had been at the heart of trading and diplomatic networks across the
Indian Ocean arena, while it continued to dominate this region as a
British imperial sub-pole in terms of expertise and inﬂuence and
through territorial protectorates and residencies.39 India hadorld politics, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95 (2005) 437e461.
e scalar sovereignty of the Government of India, Transactions of the Institute of British
rtraying postcolonial sovereigntyscapes, Political Geography 22 (2003) 157e178.
880e1950, New York, 2007.
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ce in Asia and Africa, Asian Affairs 40 (2009) 44e62; A. Lester, Imperial circuits and
tterjee, Lineages of Political Society: Studies in Postcolonial Democracy, Columbia, NY,
00, Cambridge, 2010.
: environments, constitutions, and violence, Journal of Historical Geography 37 (2011)
, 1 Also see E.L. Beverley, Frontier as Resource: Law, Crime, and Sovereignty on the
. Bhukya, The Subordination of the Sovereigns: Colonialism and the Gond Rajas in
lvest, Beyond the state? Pluralism and internationalism in early twentieth-century
1.
tional Relations, London, 1939 [1993].
s of the mid-twentieth century, International Affairs 82 (2006) 553e566; S. Legg,
egg (Ed.), Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos, London,
ons during the Republican Ascendancy, Ph.D. thesis, Kent State University, 2012.
Anticolonial Nationalism, Oxford, 2007.
ambridge, 2002; T. Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena,
S. Legg / Journal of Historical Geography 43 (2014) 96e110 99started to attend meetings of experts on technical or scientiﬁc
subjects, organised by international bureaux including the Postal
and Telegraph Unions or the Ofﬁce of Public Health at Paris. A major
step towards political recognition was taken when it was admitted
to the Councils of Empire along with the self-governing Domin-
ions,40 responding to pressure from Indian campaigning groups
since the 1880s.41 As a result, India attended the 1917 Imperial
Conference and the Imperial War Cabinet of 1918, which paved the
way for its attendance at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919.42
It was this forum that catapulted India into international con-
sciousness as a diplomatic unit, just as its nationalist movements
were becoming increasingly internationalist in their campaigns.43
While India’s nationalist emergence has garnered endless
attention, its interwar international identity remains less well
studied. In part this is because India’s position in Geneva has been
viewed as a curio or novelty, and most undeniably as an anomaly.
But this also reﬂects the failure to study the intersection of
imperialism and internationalism more broadly. While there is a
growing literature on the League’s mandated territories,44 the
League also intersected with imperial geographies in non-
mandated spaces. Zanasi, for instance, has suggested that the
League attempted to take over the colonial ‘civilising mission’
framework in its attempt to aid China’s interwar development, but
was struck by indecision over lingering evolutionary narratives,
the possibility of exporting modernity, and the exigencies of
local implementation.45 Hell has also shown how the Kingdom of
Siam, the only territory in Southeast Asia never to have been
formally colonised, became a founding member of the League and
used this status to bargain for full sovereignty and greater eco-
nomic autonomy from the French and British empires which
surrounded it.46
Other interpretations have seen the League as a foil for
American economic imperialism, often in the guise of humani-
tarianism; as raising the prospect of a global Monroe Doctrine; or
as being so heavily complicit with empires that it risked
contaminating the United Nations with its pro-imperialism.47
When dealing with European empires the League often came up40 Dominions were former Settler Colonies that had been granted self-governing right
Canada, the Union of South Africa, and New Zealand.
41 J. Kendle, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences, 1887e1911: A Study in Imperial Orga
42 Indian Statutory Commission: Memoranda Submitted by the Government of India and t
(henceforth Memoranda).
43 Indian nationalism is increasingly recognised as an international movement itself, se
M. Ramnath, Haj to Utopia: How the Ghadar Movement Charted Global Radicalism and Attem
movement See K. Manjapra,M.N. Roy: Marxism and Colonial Cosmopolitanism, Delhi, 2010
imperialism and anti-imperial networks, 1927e1939, Third Frame: Literature, Culture an
scandal about Indian women and nationalist responses see Sinha, Specters of Mother I
interaction with, Asia see C. Stolte and H. Fischer-Tiné, Imagining Asia in India: nationali
54 (2012) 65e92.
44 S. Pedersen, The meaning of the Mandates system: an argument, Geschichte und Ge
45 M. Zanasi, Exporting development: the League of Nations and Republican China, Co
46 S. Hell, Siam and the League of Nations: Modernisation, Sovereignty and Multilateral D
47 C. Schmitt, Forms of modern imperialism in international law, trans. Matthew G. H
Nomos, London, 2011 [1932], 29e45; N. Smith, The Endgame of Globalization, London, 200
the United Nations, Princeton, NJ, 2009.
48 L. Manderson, Wireless wars in the eastern area: epidemiological surveillance, dise
quarters, in: P. Weindling (Ed.), International Health Organisations and Movements, 1918e
49 A.B. Keith, The Place of Empire in the League of Nations, London, 1925. Arthur Berri
lecturing at the University of Edinburgh in Sanskrit and the constitutional history of th
50 A. Zimmern, The Third British Empire, New York, London, 1927. Sir Alfred Eckhard Zim
role in the founding of the League and championed it into the 1930s.
51 A. Zimmern, India and the world situation, in: F.M. Houlston, B.P.L. Bedi (Eds), India
52 For a broader history of India and the League see K.J. Schmidt, India’s Role in the Leag
53 On the norm-exception dialectic of liberal imperialism see Chatterjee, Lineages of Po
54 D.N. Verma, India and the League of Nations, Patna, 1968, 148.
55 Verma, India and the League of Nations (note 54).
56 A. Tambe, Climate, race science and the age of consent in the League of Nations, Thagainst the stubborn obstinacy of colonial governors inimical to
the cost (political or economic) of change.48 Yet, there were those
who believed that the League offered imperial salvation, with
Alfred Zimmern (and Arthur Berridale Keith)49 suggesting that
the Third British Empirewould be held together by bonds forged in
Geneva, not London.50 Zimmern also believed that debates in
Geneva could help India forge its own constitution, in what he
falsely believed would be India’s imminent status as dominion
and federation.51
Inside out: India and the League of Nations
This section will explore how ‘India’ was negotiated and in part
emerged through its engagement with the international. It will
show how the imperial anomaly of India’s status was, ﬁrst,
exploited by the government, secondly, negotiated in terms of di-
plomacy and silencing and, ﬁnally, criticised from the perspectives
of political philosophy and nationalism as public and intellectual
opinion in India turned against the League.52
The admission of India to the League is evidence of a norm of
international law being laid aside.53 But India’s exceptionalism
went beyond this one decision, to an ongoing state of exceptional
relations with the League. This was not an exceptionalism imposed
by Britain, but one sought directly by the Government of India itself
as a means of avoiding both economic cost and political contro-
versy. Thus, India used its position as one of only eight nations to
have a seat on the International Labour Organisation Governing
Body to voice concerns over regulations regarding work hours and
conditions, suggesting that they would be inconsistent with India’s
‘backward conditions of industrial development’.54 As such, the
Organisation’s recommendations were amended to take account of
climatic conditions, imperfect industrial organisation, and ‘special
circumstances’.55 Tambe has also shown how climate was evoked
by the League as a substitute for race-hierarchies, allowing the
Government of India to successfully argue for differential age of
consent across nations on this basis during debates about traf-
ﬁcking and the League’s 1921 convention.56s, while remaining within the British Empire, the largest of which being Australia,
nization, London, 1967.
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d Society 2 (2009) 79e94 on Nehru. For a penetrating analysis of an international
ndia (note 9). For an important recent contribution on India’s conception of, and
sm and internationalism (ca. 1905e1940), Comparative Studies in Society and History
sellschaft 32 (2006) 560e582.
mparative Studies in Society and History 49 (2007) 143e169.
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39, Cambridge, 1995, 109e133.
dale Keith (1879e1944) worked as a jurist and colonial ofﬁce civil servant before
e British Empire.
mern (1879e1957) was a British classical scholar and internationalist who played a
Analysed: International, Vol. I, London, 1933, 13e29.
ue of Nations, 1919e1939, Unpublished doctoral thesis, Florida State University, 1994.
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Colonial discourse analysis has clearly shown how India, within
imperial rhetorical frames, was silenced and over-determined, in
terms of representational sovereignty.57 But this representation
also carried over into the international realm. Questions of
silencing emerged soon after the ramiﬁcations of India’s member-
ship became clear, raising questions of statehood, sovereignty and
political subjectivity. On the 28th June 1919 the Secretary of State
for India, Edwin Montagu, and HH Maharaja Ganga Singh of Bika-
ner58 had signed the Treaty of Versailles.59 But this did not alter the
fact of India’s subservience to British foreign policy. Montague and
his Under-Secretary, Satyendra Prasanno Sinha,60 had argued that
this was no less the case for the dominions, none of whom were
sovereign states or had independent foreign relations.61 As such,
many pro-League commentators would try to argue that, in matters
of the League, India was independent.62 Though its delegates were
briefed by the Government of India, they could and did challenge
the approach of Great Britain, and voted differently. Others, how-
ever, remained incredulous, insisting that India’s membership was
merely another way of increasing Britain’s vote to six (in addition to
those of the four dominions).
This appeared to be verymuch the case in terms of governmental
sovereignty and the day-to-day administration of India’s League
membership, where the scale of the imperial mediated the national
and the international. The status of India was constantly being
negotiated by the India Ofﬁce in London, as well as the Indian Civil
Service in New Delhi. For instance, in June 1920 it was decided that
correspondence between the League Secretariat and either the
India Ofﬁce or the Government of India should pass through the
Cabinet Ofﬁce in London.63 On hearing that amember of the League
and the Director of Statistics in India had been in correspondence,
the India Ofﬁce received a sharp rebuke from the Cabinet Ofﬁce,
reminding it that direct correspondence between the Government
of India and the League of Nations was against Cabinet rules and
recognised practice. F.W. Duke, of the India Ofﬁce, countered in a
letter of 29th October 1920 that: ‘In view of the fact that India
herself is a Member of the League its position is analogous to that of
the other overseas British members whose Governments commu-
nicate directly with the League Secretariat’. The Cabinet later clar-
iﬁed that the Secretary of State for India in London remained the
channel for policy correspondence although India was allowed to
respond directly to routine requests for information.64
The representation of India was not only debated within the
imperial machine in London. On 22nd April 1924 the Home
Department in New Delhi received notice of two questions pro-
posed by Khan Bahadur Sarfaraz Hussain Khan for the Legislative57 See V. Chaturvedi, Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial, London, New York
58 Ganga Singh (1880e1943), Maharaja of Bikaner, represented India at the Imperial W
Chamber of Princes from 1920 to 1926, representing India at the League in 1924.
59 See H. Purcell, Maharajah of Bikaner: India, London, 2010, xii. Under-Secretary of Stat
who had served as his aide-de-camp in 1902.
60 Satyendra Prasanno Sinha, ﬁrst Baron Sinha (1863e1928) trained as a lawyer in Lond
India and was summoned to work with Montagu in London in 1917, where he was give
61 Schmidt, India’s Role in the League of Nations, 1919e1939 (note 52).
62 C. Hall and J. Sen, The League of Nations: A Manual for the Use of University Students an
and London, 1927, 159.
63 National Archives, New Delhi (henceforth NA)/Home(Public)/1921/195-201B/June.
64 Memoranda, 1647.
65 Khan Bahadur Sarfaraz Hussain Khan was the member of the Legislative Assembly
66 NA/Home(Public)/1924/301/24; the names and titles here are as they were listed in
67 NA/Home(Public)/1927/330.
68 NA/Home(Public)/1927/330.
69 Mohammed Shah (1877e1957), the Third Aga Khan (a title bestowed by the British) a
head of Muslim opinion in India and beyond. He was involved in constitutional reformAssembly.65 The ﬁrst requested the names of the Indian gentlemen
that the Government had sent to represent India in Imperial Con-
ferences and at the League of Nations, while the second asked
whether in future the Indian Legislatures would be allowed to elect
these gentlemen, rather than them being selected by Government?
While the second question was eventually omitted, the details of
the League delegates did not suggest ﬁgures likely to represent the
full range of pro- and anti-colonial sentiment present in India at
that time. Rather, they were often prominent ﬁgures from the
Chamber of Princes who had experience of international travel. The
listed delegates were: 1920, HH Maharaja of Nawanagar and Sir
Saiyid Ali Imam; 1921, HH the Maharao of Cutch and Rt Hon’ble V.S.
Srinivasa Sastri; 1922, HH Maharaja of Nawanagar and Sir P.S.
Sivaswamy Aiyer; 1923, HH Maharaja of Nawanagar and Mr. Saiyid
Hasan Imam.66
The questions of delegate representation and the scalar re-
lationships between London, Geneva and New Delhi were brought
together in an internal Government of India debate between March
andMay 1926.67 The questionwas whether the Secretary of State in
London or the Viceroy in New Delhi should appoint Indian repre-
sentatives at the League of Nations. India’s status as an original
member of the League, distinct from Great Britain, meant that it
should have had the right of self-representation, although the
Secretary of State had always approved the Viceroy’s choices to
date. The previous Viceroy, Lord Reading, had claimed in 1925 that
the Secretary of State was the only representative of India in im-
perial and international questions. This was also the position after
the Government of India Act of 1919. Yet Sir B.N. Sarma, a member
of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, commented that both the
scheme and spirit of the 1919 Act, as well as of the Treaty of Peace
admitting India as an integral member of the League, suggested
that the delegates should be appointed in New Delhi. The question
remained an ambiguous one, straddling international recognition
and imperial subordination, as expressed in a note for the Indian
delegate of 1926 which advised that while both the Viceroy and
Secretary of State would agree on the selection, ‘an understanding
has grown up that the authority by whom the delegates are to be
appointed shall be left undeﬁned’.68
But beyond these private debates, the unevenness of India’s
anomalous positionwas also obvious in public, and was commented
on precisely in the representational terminology of silencing. The
markers of its diplomatic subordination were clear; India was
permanently relegated to the lower ranks of the League (despite the
Aga Khan taking up Presidency of the League Assembly in 1937),69
never taking a seat in the Council, despite vastly overshadowing
other nations which had enjoyed such a privilege in terms of pop-
ulation, wealth and geographical size. Thiswas pointed out by British, 2000.
ar Conference of 1917 as well as at Versailles, and went on to be President of the
e Sir S.P. Sinha should have signed but the King expressed a preference for Bikaner,
on and returned to practice in Calcutta. He was appointed to Government service in
n a peerage and represented Indian interests in the House of Lords.
d Teachers of Secondary Schools in India, Burma and Ceylon, Calcutta, Madras, Bombay
for Patna and Chota Nagpur, holding the Muslim reserved seat.
the original ﬁle.
nd the 48th head of the Ismaili sect of the Shia Muslim community, was a moderate
debates until 1935 and, after that, headed several Indian delegations to the League.
Fig. 1. A HMV advert from the newspaper Kaisar-i-Hind, 24 July 1932.
S. Legg / Journal of Historical Geography 43 (2014) 96e110 101born Indian nationalist sympathiser C.F. Andrews who asked: ‘is
India, with all her great traditions of the past and her vast economic
and industrial importance in the world to-day, to be treated as a
mere cipher? Can she not even speak with her own voice?’.70
Andrews had not understood this ‘anomaly’ until he read an
article explaining India’s exceptional status in the League which
made it unable to contract and honour international obligations
freely.
This diplomatic silencing was also commented upon in the
Indian Legislative Assembly. In 1935 Govind Ballabh Pant71
denounced as a sham and farce the situation whereby India as a
‘member’ of the League only sang the praises of its master and
reﬂected ‘His Master’s Voice’.72 This referred to the 1899 painting of
a dog listening to a gramophone, raising parallels not only with a
speechless subaltern, but a more animalistic colonial subject/ser-
vant (Fig. 1).73 Pant went on to denounce the voice heard at Geneva
as being no more genuine than that of the American ﬁlm ‘India
Speaks’, a 1933 ﬁlm also titled ‘Bride of the East’ that claimed to
provide a travelogue of sexual habits in India, alleging the abuse
and over sexualisation of Indian women and children (Fig. 2). An
accompanying bookwas also produced featuring stills from the ﬁlm
with accompanying captions decrying Indian poverty, backward-
ness and immorality.74 The silencing metaphor was deployed again70 C. Andrews, The Challenges of the North West Frontier: A Contribution to World Peace
71 Govind Ballabh Pant (1887e1961) led Congress in the United Provinces in the 1920s,
1930s, and became Deputy Leader of Congress in the mid-1930s, when he also served a
72 Quoted in Verma, India and the League of Nations (note 54), 271 ‘HMV’ music retaile
73 It may also have referenced more contemporary debates. The metaphor itself had be
whereby nominated Indian ministers ‘would be but a phonographic automaton of his nom
More relevantly, however, in 1935 it was agreed that political discussions would be ba
sentiment in low literacy areas, directly raising the same issue of voice and national rep
74 W. Futter, India Speaks with Richard Halliburton, New York, 1933.
75 Bhagwan Das (1869e1958) was a religious and social reformer who served in the C
76 Verma, India and the League of Nations (note 54), 272.
77 C. Manning, India and the League of Nations, in: F.M. Houlston, B.P.L. Bedi (Eds), Ind
Manning (1894e1978) was a scholar of international relations. Born in South Africa but t
and the London School of Economics and published on the League the question of Briti
78 Schmidt, India’s Role in the League of Nations, 1919e1939 (note 52).
79 Verma, India and the League of Nations (note 54), ix.
80 Strang, Contested sovereignty (note 16).
81 J. Coyajee, India and the League of Nations, Madras, 1932, 10. Sir J.C. Coyajee (1875e194
Presidency College in Calcutta. In 1930 he was appointed to the Indian Council of State an
1932.in the Assembly in 1937 by Bhagwan Das75 who suggested Indian
representatives were but the nominated tools, mouthpieces,
megaphones and microphones of the British Government.76 These
accusations of silencing formed part of a growing cacophony of
dissent against India’s silenced role in the League, and of the Lea-
gue’s beneﬁts for India.
Criticising the League: from political philosophy to anti-colonial
nationalism
Even those who defended the League in Britain, and who saw it as
of great beneﬁt for India, were aware of its limitations and in-
equalities. Professor C.A.W. Manning agreed that India paid more
than any other non-member of the permanent council for relatively
little direct beneﬁt, and questioned how representative India’s
League representatives were.77 But he also stressed how various
League initiatives were of beneﬁt to the country, and how its con-
tributions in the League Assembly regarding India, Asia, and the
members in general, were fortifying its international reputation.
There is a general consensus that India’s League membership
worked to dispel world opinions regarding its backwardness,
granted it similar diplomatic status to the Dominions, and framed
its nationalist movement in interesting ways.78 The ﬁrst major
post-independence review of India and the League went so far as to
suggest that India was thrust back into world politics, regaining its
pre-colonial international status.79
But debate over the League of Nations took place across the
spectrum of Indian political opinion. Moderate commentators
launched their critiques and defences in terms of theoretical state
sovereignty. The League was a speciﬁcally internationalist body
and could not intervene, in the terms of political philosophy, in
‘domestic’ issues. Despite the tradition of this domesticity being
continually impinged upon by imperial states outside Europe,
Western states could now appeal to the Westphalian concept of
territorial integrity and exclusive sovereign autonomy to prevent
League intervention into their metropolitan and peripheral pos-
sessions.80 But when these arguments were extended to India,
they raised the very question of India’s ontological sovereign
status.
Sir J. C. Coyajee’s pro-League commentary argued that a state’s
sovereignty was fundamentally unaltered by League membership,
which supplemented rather than detracted from state sover-
eignty.81 However, others argued that colonial India did not even
constitute a sovereign nation-state in terms of international law: it
was not internationally recognised as independent; it was not self-
governing; it had been committed to war by another state; it could, London, 1937, 34.
became close to Nehru during his imprisonment for Civil Disobedience in the early
s Chief Minister of the United Provinces.
r became popular in India in the 1920s.
en used in 1926 to criticise the dyarchy system of government (introduced in 1919)
inator’. S. Sinha, Dyarchy in Indian Provinces in Theory and Practice, London, 1926, 15.
nned from the airwaves in order to prevent the promotion of pro-independence
resentation. I am indebted to Alasdair Pinkerton for this point.
entral Legislative Assembly and was a Congress sympathiser.
ia Analysed: International, Vol. I, London, 1933, 30e65. Charles Anthony Woodward
rained in England, he worked at the League in 1922e23 but later lectured at Oxford
sh Dominions.
3) was a Parsi economist who had trained in Bombay and Cambridge before joining
d attended the sessions of the League of Nations in Geneva as a delegate in 1930 and
Fig. 2. India Speaks ﬁlm poster, downloaded from http://www.movieposterdb.com/poster/8d378566.
S. Legg / Journal of Historical Geography 43 (2014) 96e110102not enter international obligations of its own will; and it did not
have freedom of action from Britain.82 Quoting Winston Churchill,
Verma concurred that colonial India’s international status had been
‘ﬁctitious and farcical’.8382 Verma, India and the League of Nations (note 54), 29.
83 Verma, India and the League of Nations (note 54), 31.The contradictions of India’s anomalous membership were
widely commented upon at the time. Had India applied for mem-
bership of the League it would have been rejected as a non-self-
governing state; its membership relied solely on having signed
S. Legg / Journal of Historical Geography 43 (2014) 96e110 103the Versailles treaty. The terms used to describe this predicament
altered, but the contradiction at the heart of India’s status did not.
Hall and Sen acknowledged India’s status as the only one of the 56
member states of the League not to be self-governing, but argued
that in international matters India was self-governing, and that the
League could not help nations on the path to democratic govern-
ment.84 Ram and Sharma were less ambiguous: ‘It is surely a
curious phenomenon that a country should have the right to direct,
conjointly with others, the common affairs of 54 countries, without
the right to govern herself. Looked at from this point of view, India
is a political curiosity inside the League’.85 Even Coyajee admitted
that India’s status was anomalous, but insisted that dominions had
similar problems.86
As these comments make clear, the supposed beneﬁts brought
to India by its membership were far from universally appreciated
by Indians themselves. This was in spite of initial enthusiasm not
just from political commentators, but from anti-colonial national-
ists as well. During the Versailles debates the nationalist politician
Bal Gangadhar Tilak wrote to Clemenceau, the French Prime Min-
ister, posing India as a self-contained yet vast, and potentially
powerful, state on the international plane.87 Manela has pursued
the other ways in which India attempted to use the diplomatic
sphere to assert its growing sense of national entitlement in synch
with broader networks of international anti-colonialism. Wilson’s
call for self-determinism was taken up as a political principle by
nationalisms that challenged imperialisms and as a practice in
asserting the case for independence, though these were largely
ineffective.88
India’s massive contribution to the war (estimated to be
1,200,000 men) led to great expectations of reward, and enthu-
siasm for Wilson. His principles had been taken up in 1917 in
India, and had been circulated by the Irish theosophist and
Indian nationalist Annie Besant; Wilson was also petitioned by
the Ghadr revolutionary party, the more moderate Lala Lajpat Rai,
and the later Comintern Presidium member M.N. Roy.89 After the
war the Indian National Congress and Muslim League took up
the call for self-determination, despite their disappointment at
the British selection of Indian delegates at Geneva. When it
became clear that post-war constitutional reform in India would
disappoint common expectations, the nationalist press turned
against Wilson.
The ‘Golden Peacock’s Diary’ in the New Burma newspaper on
29th May 1920 suggested that self-determination was not just for
white nations (as Ireland was also denied) but for old nations. But
the denying of this right to Egypt, Ireland and India had exposed
self-determination as ‘a huge international sham’.90 For Congress
leader M.K. Gandhi, the Khilafat movement (a pan-Islamist protest
at the Allied treatment of the Ottoman Empire after the war) had84 Hall and Sen, The League of Nations (note 62), 158.
85 V.S. Ram and B.M. Sharma, India & the League of Nations, Lucknow, 1932, 139.
86 Coyajee, India and the League of Nations (note 81), 26.
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88 Manela, The Wilsonian Moment (note 38), 62.
89 Manjapra, M.N. Roy (note 43), 34.
90 NA/Reforms(General)/1920/87-117A.
91 K. Grant and L. Trivedi, A question of trust: the Government of India, the League of
International Oversight of Colonial Rule in Historical Perspective, Lanham, MD, 2006, 21e4
92 Manela, The Wilsonian Moment (note 38), 170.
93 Schmidt, India’s Role in the League of Nations, 1919e1939 (note 52).
94 K. Shah and G.J. Bahadurji, A Commentary on the Government of India Act, (consolida
Indian Finance, and the Native States in India, Bombay, 1924, 11.
95 C. Vijiaraghavachariar, League of Nations and India’s Emancipation, Madras, 1929.
96 H.J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics, London, 1925.
97 Ram and Sharma, India & the League of Nations (note 85).
98 See Nehru’s, Glimpses of World History, Allahabad, 1934, 681e683, quoted in Verma,exposed the League not only as capitalist but as Christian, in its
denial of self-determination to Ottoman Muslims.91 Congress’s
Rowlatt satyagraha in 1919, followed by the non-cooperation
movement, appealed to Indian tradition, in clear rejection of
claims to international order or civilisation.92
While Manela’s investigations were focused on Wilson and the
debates over Versailles, the League attracted ongoing comment in
India where, in general, its popularity declined. When the Legis-
lative Assembly was allowed to discuss the League in 1923 it
recorded anger at the treatment of Indian labourers in ex-German
mandates, while further questions were raised about the size of
India’s contribution and its lack of democratic representation in
Geneva.93 In 1924 the assessment by a Professor of Economics at
the University of Bombay of the 1919 Government of India
Act casually decried the League for its lack of policing powers, and
its foundation on consent and compliance: ‘To the enthusiastic
idealist, the League may appear as the embryo of the future,
full-grown “Parliament of Man”: but judged from its actual history
of four years’ existence, the League is still only e a pious
aspiration’.94
The former President of the Indian National Congress, C. Vijiar-
aghavachariar, outlined a more aggressive vision of the possibilities
of the League.95 He quoted the political theorist of politics and
sovereignty Harold Laski’s assertion that India must be allowed to
appeal to the League as a representation of ‘the commonwill of the
world’.96 This would help, in Vijiaraghavachariar’s view, discipline
the Indian population, who had proven themselves unready for the
challenge of non-cooperation in the early 1920s. The logic was that
India had a right to call on the League regarding any threat to world
peace, but that its delegates would not do this as theywere selected
by the British government. It was necessary to take on Britain ‘in
any sphere’. The League presented a forum in which to challenge
the government on, for instance, its ‘anti-national ﬁnancial policy’
or its treatment of minorities.
Indian criticisms also targeted the activities of the League on
the world stage. Ram and Sharma listed the League’s failure to
effectively enforce disarmament, to include the USSR, USA,
Afghanistan and Brazil in its membership, to encourage the self-
government of ‘dependencies’ or the independence of mandates,
or to grant seats on the Council to African, Australian, American or
Asian nations, besides China.97 In broader terms it was criticised as
an institution that excelled in advising but not in actually dealing
with crises.
For Jawaharlal Nehru, the League’s noble principles had been
squandered, leaving it as little more than a tool of imperialism for
the Great Powers.98 This built on his late-1920s series of pamphlets
that had denounced League inaction over the oppressed within the
British Empire, and contrasted its ideals with the harsh facts ofNations, and Mohandas Gandhi, in: R.M. Douglas et al. (Eds), Imperialism on Trial:
4, 22.
ted) of 1919, with Additional Chapters on the Indian Local Governments, Indian Army,
India and the League of Nations (note 54), 274.
S. Legg / Journal of Historical Geography 43 (2014) 96e110104reality. By 1937 C.F. Andrews could report a profound distrust of the
‘League of Robbers’ among educated Indians, who saw it as a
European club devised to divide the spoil, and guard the loot, of
imperialism. The failure to censure Italy effectively over its invasion
of Abyssinia in 1935 did untold harm to the League in India. In a
Legislative Assembly motion in 1937 Seth Sheodas Daga, repre-
senting the Indian National Congress, denounced the League of
‘Brigands and Butchers’ that had failed to protect China, Abyssinia,
the Rhineland or Spain. In response, Sir Abdul Hamid conceded
theseweakness, but argued that India acquired intellectual,99 social
and commercial beneﬁts from its membership.100 In surveying
similar critical literature Verma also noted the more positive
commentary in India on the League’s work on labour, intellectual
cooperation and anti-trafﬁcking.101
Regarding the latter, clause 23c of the League Covenant was
honoured with the ﬁrst meeting of the Advisory Committee for
Trafﬁcking in Women and Children in 1922.102 It worked through
conventions and publications to encourage legislation and policies
to reduce enforced prostitution and international trafﬁcking.103 As
has been demonstrated at length regarding League enquiries into
trafﬁcking in women and children, the Government of India
constantly invoked the ‘domestic’ to defend itself from League
enquiries.104 But the division between Princely and British Indian
States within the Indian Empire provoked a much more complex
dilemma over territory and sovereignty than that of the domestic/
international debate.
Outside in: internal political geographies and international
trafﬁcking
As an international anomaly, India reformulated Britain’s imperial
sovereignty regime through debates about representation (diplo-
matic silencing), government (administering internationalism),
theory (political philosophies of statehood) and politics (anti-
colonialism). The internal anomaly of the Princely States, and the
problems raised by trafﬁcking in women and children, raised
similar sovereign dilemmas within the scale of the subcontinent,
but in very different forms. Territorial questions of sovereignty
emerged regarding India’s regional political geographies, to which
theories of quasi-sovereignty and unfettered paramountcy were
proffered in response. Mundane governmental sovereignties of
administrative indirect rule of the Princely States were threatened
by theoretical possibilities opened up by League membership,
which provoked constitutional dilemmas, representational clashes
between the Viceroy and the Chamber of Princes, and a crisis of
contractual sovereignty as the implications of India’s commitments
in international law to tackle trafﬁcking in women and children
became clear.99 See D. Laqua, Transnational intellectual cooperation, the League of Nations, and the
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Studies 46 (2012) 1459e1505.
107 For a review of broader literature on the Princely States see F. Groenhout, The histor
Compass 4 (2006) 629e644.
108 I. Copland, The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917e1947, Cambridge, 199
109 Nair, Mysore Modern (note 31), 14.
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112 Ramusack, The Indian Princes and their States (note 105), 94; also see K. Mantena, AIndia’s princely geographies
While the diplomatic status of India was a complex and vexed one
for the League of Nations, so was the question of India’s geography
that the League’s legal conventions and probing questions
regarding the trafﬁcking in women and children committee pro-
voked. This geography was an internal one of territory and quasi-
sovereignty, but one that the League threw into a new light.
‘India’ was a founding member of the League, but it was also
part of the British Empire, although it was an Empire within the
Empire, rather than a colony. Within the subcontinent, ‘India’ was
divided into British India and the Princely States (of which there
were 562 in 1929)105 while British India was divided into three
Presidencies (Bengal, Bombay and Madras) and subdivided into
Provinces (Fig. 3). Thus, when each member of the League was
asked to appoint a coordinating authority for trafﬁcking in women
and children policy, ‘India’ returned four, one for each of the three
Presidencies plus Burma, while after partial devolution under the
dyarchy system in 1919 it was the provinces who would legislate
on trafﬁcking and prostitution.106 The Princely States were terri-
tories unconquered at the time of the Government of India Act of
1858 who were guaranteed their continued existence by Queen
Victoria’s pledge of the same year.107 Yet, the States had to accept
British residents at court, the regulation of succession and control
of their foreign affairs, as had been the case since the 1820s.108
Their independence was further intruded upon by legal re-
workings of BritisheIndian state relations in the 1870se90s that
increased British powers of intervention. But the Princely States
also created regional spaces for experiments with modernisation
that could be less constrained than in the politically sensitive
British Indian States.109 These experiments took place within
the ‘quasi-sovereignty’ of the Princely States as deﬁned by
‘imperial law’.110
Benton has shown how the theoretical concept of quasi-
sovereignty was invented by the mid- to late-nineteenth-century
international legal community in an attempt to classify dependent
imperial sub-polities that were technically outside the scope of in-
ternational law.111 These attempts included analogy (empires as in-
ternational orders or legal hegemonies) or description (ranking
polities from federalisms to coalitions of near independent states).
On the latter scale thePrincely Stateswere somewhere in themiddle,
but analogically it was stressed that the British had theoretically
unlimited power over the Princes. Such thinkingwas justiﬁed by the
principle of divisible sovereignty. Sir Henry Maine, a lawmember of
the Viceroy of India’s council, claimed in 1887 that sovereignty was
an assemblage of separate powers, including those regarding peace
orwar, justice, and lawmaking.112 To possess all of them indicated an
independent sovereign, but they could be divided, as was the case inproblem of order, Journal of Global History 6 (2011) 223e247.
nd children in the 1920s (note 6).
ional human rights regime during the interwar years (note 8).
in British India, between registration (1888) and suppression (1923), Modern Asian
y of the Indian princely states: bringing the puppets back onto centre stage, History
7, 15.
vereignty, 1870e1900, Law and History Review 26 (2008) 595e619.
libis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism, Princeton, NJ, 2010.
Fig. 3. Political Divisions of the Indian Empire, c. 1916, downloaded from http://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/20583/20583-h/20583-h.htm. The map is the frontispiece to R.V. Russell,
The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India, London, 1916; it was adapted from the Imperial Gazetteer of India: Atlas, Vol. 26, Oxford, 1909, map 20.
S. Legg / Journal of Historical Geography 43 (2014) 96e110 105the Princely States, and in the imperial policy of indirect rule more
generally.113 Yet this left the problem of how to encourage ‘devel-
opment’, and to exert control, in these spaces. Sir Charles Lewis
Tupper, drawing on Maine, argued in the 1890s that the Princely
States should be exempt from international law and be governed by
ofﬁcially determined law (that is ‘political’ not ‘diplomatic’ law)
based upon the doctrines of divisible sovereignty and usage. But this
determination would be relating to decisions based on British pre-
cedent, not on general rules. This established, as Benton put it, ‘in-
determinacy as policy’.114 While Benton’s studies conclude in 1900,
this policy was very much taken forward into the Prince’s almost-
international life in the interwar period.113 Metcalf, Imperial Connections (note 39), 33.
114 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty (note 29), 258.
115 W. Ernst and B. Pari, People, princes and colonialism, in: W. Ernst, B. Pari (Eds), Ind
116 Copland, The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917e1947 (note 108), 30, 55The governmental sovereignty of the Princely States was eroded
through controls over trade, commerce and communication,
although these interventions were reined in during 1909e10 in an
attempt to guarantee Princely support against the emergent
nationalist movement.115 This ‘laissez faire’ period was undermined
in 1926 when Viceroy Reading’s campaign to reclaim British su-
premacy over the Princes culminated in an open letter declaring
that the sovereignty of the British Crown in India was supreme, and
that it had the right to intervene in the Princely States due to its
conditions of ‘unfettered paramountcy’.116 The League of Nations
threw into question, however, the nature of this paramountcy, even
though the term had itself been negotiated and included atia’s Princely States: People, Princes and Colonialism, Abingdon, 2007, 1e14.
.
S. Legg / Journal of Historical Geography 43 (2014) 96e110106Versailles.117 In one sense, British and Princely India had a unity at
the international level that they had never had at the national
level118; a Princely representative had always taken a place in the
Indian delegation, but had spoken for all of India.119 But this could
not deny the government’s view that many Princely territories
were ‘backward’ and would need to be written out of League con-
ventions, while encouraging reform on similar lines. Literature to
date has failed to consider the impact of the League upon the
development of the Princely States, at most noting the role of
Princely delegates to Geneva.120
Yet some of the questions provoked by ‘India’s’ League mem-
bership had been outlined as early as 1924 inM.V. Kibe’s The League
of Nations and the Indian States.121 The aim of the book was to
encourage the betterment of the Princely States and the people of
India, the aspiration to this betterment having been roused by ideas
‘prevailing all over the world’. Kibe portrayed the Princely States as
being under a state of military occupation by the British, not one of
dialogue or association. In contrast he, falsely, suggested that the
League was open to all states and that it existed to check imperi-
alism. Despite this misunderstanding, Kibe did hit upon a key fear
of the central government. He suggested that, in relation to Great
Britain, British India was a state, just like the Indian States, and that
it was British India who had signed the Treaty of Versailles. Thus it
was the Government of (British) India which became a member of
the League and had deigned to speak on the Princes’ behalf. It was,
therefore, suggested that Indian States become members of the
League themselves, and that the latter act as an independent
adjudicator of disputes between British and Princely India.
While accepting that a ‘state’ should be deﬁned as self-
governing, Kibe had pointed out that Bulgaria, though a member
of the League, had military and ﬁnancial restrictions imposed by
Versailles, just as Austria was not allowed treaty relations with
other countries.122 Overplaying their actual independence, Kibe
suggested that the Princely States had, besides war making, all the
rights which form the attributes of sovereignty, but the Governor-
General’s decree of 1891 had ﬁrmly stated that the principles of
international law would have no bearing on the relationships be-
tween the Queen-Empress/Government of India and the Princely
States.123
This conundrum of the ‘anomalous legal spaces’ of the Princely
States,124 within the broader anomaly of India within the League,
was the subject of extensive correspondence between the Secretary
of State, the Viceroy, and the heads of various governmental de-
partments between September 1925 and October 1927.125 The
debate was prompted on 29th September 1925 by a letter from
N.M. Joshi, a member of the Legislative Assembly, to the Govern-
ment. Joshi queried the extent of the government’s legislative or
administrative actions in relation to conventions passed by the117 Purcell, Maharajah of Bikaner (note 59), x.
118 Coyajee, India and the League of Nations (note 81), 128.
119 Ram and Sharma, India & the League of Nations (note 85), 142.
120 S.R. Ashton, British Policy Towards the Indian States, 1905e1939, London, 1982, 66,
1916e1947, Leiden, 1999, 72.
121 Rao Bahadur Sardar Madhav Vinayak Kibe (1877end) was a scholar of Indian histor
Minister of Indore State. He published on eighteenth-century Marathi documents and th
addition to his writings on the League he also provided commentary pieces on the ove
government, the fate of the Princely States, and a caustic paper against the potential of
Editorial: current topics, The Economic Journal 34 (1924) 294e299; M. Kibe, The states
chamber, Triveni March (1939); and M. Kibe, The HindueMuslim problem, Triveni Maye
122 M. Kibe, The League of Nations and the Indian States, Indore, 1924, 18.
123 Kibe, The League of Nations and the Indian States (note 122), 26.
124 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty (note 29), 9.
125 NA/Foreign and Political/1926/264(2)P (Secret).
126 NA/Foreign and Political/1926/264(2)P (Secret).
127 NA/Foreign and Political/1926/264(2)P (Secret).League of Nations or other international Conventions. While appre-
ciating the ‘constitutional difﬁculties’ posed by the Indian States, Joshi
insisted that if India was to be true to its international obligations
then somethingwould have to be done in these territories. H.R. Lynch
Blosse, of the Foreign and Political Department, commented on 13th
October that as a last resort the Government of India could compel
recalcitrant States to come in line with conventions signed on their
behalf, though such extreme action should have been unnecessary as
most States had been willing to comply with international conven-
tions signed on their behalf. The territorial and contractual complexity
of the questions was, however, made clear by G.H. Spence of the
Legislative Department in a note of 16th October 1925:206; J.
y and m
e religio
r-taxatio
League o
and fede
June (1The Member of the League being ‘India’, League Conventions
are necessarily ratiﬁed on behalf of ‘India’ and the obligations
arising from ratiﬁcation attach to ‘India’. Action necessary to
implement the ratiﬁcation of Conventions is taken in the
administrative Department of the GoI [Government of India]
concerned, and this Department is not in a position to state
what efforts, if any, are made to ensure the taking of the
necessary action in the States as well as in British India.126Whilst this statement highlighted the problematic nature of the
category ‘India’, L. Graham of the same Department disagreed with
its conclusions, stressing that each Department of the Government
of India could not operate autonomously in relation to League af-
fairs. As a single member of the League, India would need a single
ratifying authority, and could entertain no question of Indian States
ratifying or refusing League conventions. In his note of 16th October
he continued that: ‘I have long been expecting this question to be
raised and it is only one of the many questions involved in the
anomalous position of India as a member of the League’.127
This disagreement summarised the main problem that was
debated for the following two years in extensive internal dialogue
across the departments of government, often in reaction to
prompts issued by the Secretary of State in London. Each Depart-
ment was asked to comment upon the international conventions
which affected it, and whether they had made efforts to encourage
the Princely States to adopt similar measures. The replies proved a
complete lack of common policy regarding the Indian States, and a
panoply of suggested negotiations of this problem. The Department
of Industries and Labour acknowledged that the status of the Indian
States in the Treaty of Versailles was undeﬁned, although states
with colonies, protectorates or possessions which were not self-
governing were obliged to apply conventions to them, but the
Foreign and Political Department had already ruled out consider-
ation of the Indian States as protectorates. During the Versailles
negotiations, the Maharaja of Bikaner had insisted that laws in
British India in relation to League conventions would not apply toMacleod, Sovereignty, Power, Control: Politics in the State of Western India,
ember of the Royal Asiatic Society who went on to become Deputy Prime
us geographies of ‘Lanka’ (M.V. Kibe, The Location of Lanka, Poona, 1947). In
n of native states peoples and their economic relationship with the Indian
f Nations procedures being used to protect Muslim minorities in India, see
ration, Triveni MayeJune (1933); M. Kibe, The rejuvenation of the Princes’
931).
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amended to insist on due regard to ‘those countries in which cli-
matic conditions, the imperfect development of industrial organi-
sations or other special circumstances make the industrial
conditions substantially different’, but this amendment seemed to
have been forgotten, for the time being.128
While analogies weremade to provisions in existence for federal
states, this suggestionwas ruled out by the Legislative Department.
Some clarity was provided by Viceroy Reading’s opening speech at
the session of the Chamber of Princes held in January 1926.129 This
was the same year in which his campaign to reinforce British
paramountcy was coming to a head, and marked a stark represen-
tational and governmental claim over the quasi-sovereignty of the
Princes. He praised the participation of members of the Chamber in
League and international assemblies, suggesting that they promote
‘reﬂection to larger lines concernedwith the solidarity of the unit of
which India is a part and the higher calls of its destiny and hu-
manity at large’. Such participationwas also said, however, to entail
obligations and responsibilities. The Viceroy emphasised his con-
ﬁdence in the ‘co-operation’ of the assembled Highnesses in dis-
charging their responsibilities. He continued:128 NA/
129 A fo
gather
130 NA/
131 NA/
132 NA/
133 SeeI need not assure you that there is no intention of
encroaching unnecessarily on the freedom with which you
conduct your internal administrations. At the same time I
must ask you to realise that one of themost important results
of the creation of the League of Nations has been to bring into
existence machinery by which international inﬂuence, or
rather the joint public opinion of many countries, can be
brought to bear on the domestic affairs of all countries and all
administrations.130This suggestion was responded to, however, in a speech by the
Maharaja of Patiala in the Chamber of Princes, of which he was the
new Chancellor, on 25th November 1926. Whilst not questioning
the humanitarian spirit of the international conventions in ques-
tions, he insisted that: ‘howsoever great the pressure exerted upon
the Government of India, by international opinion, for their im-
mediate ratiﬁcation, there none the less exist obligations, anterior
in time and no less sacred in character, which bind the Government
of India to respect the autonomy of the Indian States’. As a result of
this constitutional dilemma, the decision was reached by the
Government of India in 1926 to leave things as they were until
there was a practical necessity for action.
This necessity arose, however, in the shape of despatch from the
Secretary of State for India, issued on 24th March 1927. Keen to
avoid the status of the Princely States being investigated by the
Permanent Court of International Justice (inaugurated in 1922), the
Secretary wished it to be made public that obligations undertaken
by the Government of India, in this case the International Labour
Convention, could only be applied to British India. Although the
central government admitted the ﬂaws in this stance, it was agreed
to have no more faults than any alternative solution to India’s
anomalous position with regard to the League. These geographical
anomalies would play out repeatedly as the Government of India
attempted to honour its commitments to legal conventions con-
cerning the suppression of trafﬁcking in women and children.Foreign and Political/1926/264(2)P (Secret).
rum founded in 1920 alongside the new Central Legislative Assembly and Counci
in New Delhi and institutionally represented their transition from pageantry to
Foreign and Political/1926/264(2)P (Secret).
Home(Judicial)/1927/733/27.
Home(Police)/1927/85/II/27.
NA/Home(Juridical)/1927/1158. Even amongst the vast diversity of Princely StateInternational or internal trafﬁcking?
The sheer scale of India meant that ‘international trafﬁcking’ was
a contentious concept, as women could be moved across greater
distances within India and not be internationally trafﬁcked than it
would take to move them across multiple nations in Europe. This
was at the heart of the controversy of trafﬁcking in India, which
led to various governmental enquiries about brothel inhabitants.
One of these took place in 1927 following League enquiries
regarding the provenance of the women supplied to Bombay’s
brothels.131 The Bombay authorities responded to the Home
Department’s request for information on 31st May by stating that
there was no question of international trafﬁcking, but there was
clear evidence of women being trafﬁcked within India to Bom-
bay’s brothels. Following further enquiries made by the central
government, the Punjab Government assured the Home Depart-
ment, on 6th July 1927, that there was no trafﬁc of women to
Bombay from its population. It did insist, however, that there was
considerable trafﬁc within India to supply women to the Punjab
itself.
In the 1920s the Government of India was forced to consider the
ramiﬁcations of Princely political geographies for its commitments,
having signed the 1921 International Convention for the Suppres-
sion of the Trafﬁc in Women and Children.132 India was now bound
to implement the conditions of 1904 or 1910 conventions on the
‘white slave trade’, to tackle trafﬁcking in women and children, and
acts deemed preparatory to such trade, and to allow for the
extradition of persons accused of TWC. This convention for the
suppression of TWC had been signed by ‘India’, whereas the 1904
convention had been signed by Britain for ‘India’ and thus only
referred to British India, not the Princely States. These Indian States
were now, technically, under the same obligations as the British
ones, and would thus need legislation to enforce the obligations of
the convention. This would involve appointing a coordinating au-
thority, sending reports to the League, and passing legislation
against procurement. Unsure of how to proceed, the central gov-
ernment consulted the four existing authorities in British India to
ask them their opinions. Sir Charles Tegart, the Calcutta Commis-
sioner of Police, replied on 19th February 1928 that he believed
there to be trade from the Princely States to British India, and thus
some sort of legislation would be advised. Evidence of this had
come to light during a brief scandal in February 1927 when a 16
year old Nepalese girl named Maiya Rani, alias Rajkumari, accused
her uncle of kidnapping her from the Political Residency protec-
torate state of Nepal and selling her to Hiralal Agarwalla in
Calcutta.133 This ‘caused a great sensation’ amongst the local Nepali
and Gurkha communities, in themidst of which the Secretary of the
Gurkha Association stabbed Hilralal to death at his ofﬁce. Police
enquiries showed that many girls were being trafﬁcked from Nepal
to Benares, where they were sold as wives, often destined for the
Punjab. In a separate case in May 1927, a raid on a brothel in
Calcutta had found three girls from the Princely State of Kashmir,
aged 15, 11 and eight, living under a Kashmiri madame. As a result
of these enquiries a letter was sent to the Princely States asking that
they take action inline with a convention to which they were now
signed.l of State, resulting from the 1919 Government of India Act. It allowed the Princes to
politics in colonial India.
s, Nepal stands out as an exception as Britain recognised its de jure independence.
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Government of Indiamade sure that they would notmake the same
mistake again when a new League convention was proposed.
Following a conference in Geneva in October 1933, the League
proposed a convention that would augment the agreements of
1904, 1910 and 1921 by penalising anyone who procured females of
any age, even with their consent, for immoral purposes to be car-
ried out in another ‘country’, whether or not those offensive acts
were committed in different ‘countries’.134 As deﬁned by the
convention, a country would include colonies, protectorates, and
territories under the suzerainty or mandate of the signing party.
The effect of this deﬁnition would be that Indian States could be
treated as foreign states relative to British India, and that trafﬁc
within the subcontinent between Princely and British Indian States
or between Princely States would thus become international
trafﬁcking.
On 14th December 1933 the Home Department circulated the
draft convention for comment to the various provinces of British
India, with a commentary that dissuaded any contemplation of its
applicability.135 The wording of the convention, it was argued,
would treat Indian States as foreign states relative to India, and
would thus be open to objection. The note, from the Joint Secretary
of the Home Judicial Department, showed how the anomalous
situation of the Indian States was, in fact, being used as a conve-
nient means of sidestepping the other, more substantial, obliga-
tions that the convention would have imposed:134 Lea
135 Del
136 DA/
137 Lea
138 NA/
139 NA/
140 NA/
141 J. N
longer c
the cas
142 Mem
143 See
144 MemIt appears to the Government of India that there are obvious
objections to such an arrangement as British India and the
States form a single geographical unit. There are social and
religious factors which make it impossible in present con-
ditions to penalise the procuration of women within this
area. Evenwithin the narrower limits of British India it seems
impracticable to penalise all procuration.136In conclusion, it was stated that if internal trafﬁcking were allowed
to continue, it would not be practical to ban it between British and
Indian States. As such, on 4th December 1934 the India Ofﬁce wrote
to Eric Ekstrand, head of the Social Questions section of the League,
clearly stating that: ‘owing to the nature of the relations which exist
between British India and Indian States, which under the deﬁnition
in Article 1 of the Conventionwould be treated as foreign countries
relative to British India, the Government of India does not feel itself
in a position to accede to the Convention’.137
The issue was again raised by a draft convention drawn up
during the TWC Committee’s session in 1936 that aimed to address
the expulsion of procurers.138 In brieﬁng the Indian delegate, the
Home Department insisted that any articles of the convention that
addressed international trafﬁc would be of little relevance to India,
as there was barely any international trafﬁcking, while internal
trafﬁcking was now a matter for provincial governments, most of
which had recently legislated against the evil. As such, whenMrs. K.gue of Nations, Diplomatic Conference Concerning the Suppression of Trafﬁc in Wom
hi State Archives (henceforth DA)/Chief Commissioner’s ﬁles (henceforth CC)/Ho
CC/Home/1934/74B.
gue of Nations Archive, United Nations Ofﬁce at Geneva/11B/15088/7285 (carton
Home(Jails)/1938/43/3/38.
Home(Jails)/1938/43/10/38.
Home(Police)/1938/43/12.
air, ‘Imperial reason’, national honour and new patriarchal compacts in early tw
ampaigns against devadasi ‘temple prostitutes’, see Nair, Mysore Modern (note 31
e of Nawab Sultan Jahan Beham of Bhopal, in: W. Ernst, B. Pari (Eds), India’s Prin
oranda, 1636.
Benton, A Search for Sovereignty (note 29), 245.
oranda, 1648.Bose reported to the TWC Committee, she stressed that the
Government of India could not conform to the 1933 Convention, or
any following acts, due to the distinction it would enforce between
British and Indian States.139 This would continue to be a position of
great discomfort for the Government of India, as revealed in the
brief given to the Indian delegate to the Advisory Committee on
Social Questions for the June 1939 meeting.140 It was remembered
that recent conventions had made a reservation excluding the In-
dian States, but that this had not been done for the TWC Conven-
tion in 1921. The obligations of the Convention could have forced
the central government into direct interference with the domestic
administration of the Indian States, thus it was requested that any
reference to the states be avoided. It was true, however, that many
states in India, whether British or Princely, had been considering or
enacting legislation against trafﬁcking in women and children. For
instance, suppressionist legislation was passed in Mysore in 1937
while Bhopal had a much longer, if contentious, history of in-
terventions into women’s rights.141 The nature of much of this
legislation had been affected, directly or indirectly, by the reports,
terminology, advice and educative materials circulated by the
League, despite the Princely States’ uneasy ambivalence regarding
their international status. After the ﬁrst decade of League mem-
bership the India Ofﬁce had already noted in 1930 that:en of Fu
me/193
R4685)
entieth
), chapt
cely StaIt is India, and not British India, which is a member of
the League, and ‘India’ as deﬁned in the Interpretation Act
includes the Indian States. The position of these quasi-
independent States in regard to India’s representation, and
to international obligations that may be undertaken, was
at ﬁrst left undetermined, and. special problems in this
connection had to be faced.142The British Interpretation Act (1889) deﬁned India as British India
plus territories of any native prince or chief under the suzerainty of
His Majesty. Suzerainty was here tackled with the rubric of para-
mountcy143: ‘The Paramount Power exercises some of the attri-
butes of sovereignty on behalf of the States, and in respect of those
attributes His Majesty’s Government can bind a State absolutely
and by its own authority’.144 While the state technically could bind
the Princes, whether it would do so depended on the subject: for
international affairs the British could insist on conformity;
for domestic concerns the British would rely on inﬂuence and
persuasion. While League conventions were meant to be accepted
for the whole country, during the internal government debate from
1925 to 1926 article 405 of the Treaty of Versailles had ﬁnally been
remembered, allowing India to ‘contract out’ parts of its territory,
which was used in future cases between the Princely States and the
League more broadly. This power was summarised in the 1930
‘Simon Report’ on Indian constitution development, which re-
ﬂected back on domestic developments since the 1919 Government
of India Act, but also re-considered India’s international situation,
providing a series of fascinating insights into the scalar andll Age, Geneva, 1933.
4/74B.
.
-century India, History Workshop Journal 66 (2008) 208e226. This built on
er 6; S. Lambert-Hurley, Historicizing debates over women’s status in Islam:
tes: People, Princes and Colonialism, Abingdon, 2007, 139e156.
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part of the British Empire.Conclusion: anomalies, scales, and sovereignties
The anomaly is evident. On the one hand, as the [British]145 Mem
control
146 Mem
147 Mem
148 Mem
149 ‘Thi
every tr
150 Mem
151 R. I
152 Mem
153 It is
M. Bhagpowers of superintendence, direction and control, vested by
the [1919] Act. extend a fortiori to all matters affecting her
external relations. The existence of these powers would,
therefore, seem to preclude the idea of a separate interna-
tional status for India. On the other hand, by being placed on
an equality with the self-governing Dominions at Versailles
and in the League of Nations, India has been treated as it she
had attained to the same kind of separate nationhood as that
now enjoyed by those Dominions.145The Simon Report chapter on ‘India in the British Empire’
comprised submissions by the Government of India (from New
Delhi) and the India Ofﬁce (from London). The latter emphatically
pronounced India’s difference from the self-governing Domin-
ions, but admitted that India had an exceptional international
existence for a state within the British Empire. While the League
could in no way effect relations between India and Britain, it was
admitted to beneﬁt India in terms of diplomatic experience,
public interest in international affairs, and economic and social
questions.
However, as the quote above demonstrates, while refusing to
acknowledge the questions provoked by India’s internal anoma-
lies, its external anomaly was returned to again and again. It was
unique among ‘all the non-Self-Governing States, Dominions or
Colonies throughout the world’ through its founding member
status of the League, and would remain the only such ‘striking
paradox’ as long as the non-self-governing membership exclu-
sions for new entrants remained in the covenant.146 Under the
sub-heading ‘Anomalies of the New Status’ it was insisted that:
‘The new status cannot by any process of reasoning be harmonised
with the constitutional relations between India and His Majesty’s
Government’.147 As the India Ofﬁce commented, while the rules of
business in the Indian Legislature forbade the discussion of
foreign affairs, they had been ‘interpreted with sufﬁcient elasticity
to allow discussion of many questions actually before the League
which affect India’.148
This rhetorical ﬂourish was typical of India Ofﬁce (London) and
Raisina Hill (New Delhi) mandarin rhetoric, but also of a broader
imperial negotiation of the elasticity of international law.149 This
was achieved through a policy of, wherever possible, non-
deﬁnition. Terms would be left ambiguous and thus open to
interpretation, hence the policy was: ‘That a formal decision to
the effect that either the Secretary of State or the Government in
India is the proper authority in Imperial and international ques-
tions should be avoided’.150 A second tactic was to stress how
difﬁcult it was to make India’s new status a reality, suggestingoranda, 1632. The ﬁrst part refers to the 1919 Government of India Act, which de
over India’s external relations.
oranda, 1633, 1635.
oranda, 1636.
oranda, 1637.
s remarkable elasticity and extensibility, this holding open of all possibilities, this
ue and great imperialism’: Schmitt, Forms of modern imperialism in internation
oranda, 1644.
nden, Imagining India, Oxford, 1990, 47; Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919e1939
oranda, 1632.
possible to argue that these debates about the Princely States foreshadowed, and
avan, Princely states and the making of modern India, Indian Economic & Socialthat the outcome of 1919 discussions in the Versailles Hall of
Mirrors had been an unreality, a fantasy. This condensed both the
Hegelian view of India as a dream world with E.H. Carr’s denunci-
ation of liberal-internationalist dreamers, who set their sights to
the stars, not the reality of politics on the ground.151 The Secretary
of State’s job, therefore, was to make India’s status a reality for
practical purposes, within the widest possible limits. The question
of India’s ‘quasi-independence’ in external relations was, however,
immediately dismissed by the India Ofﬁce: ‘The whole situation,
besides being theoretically anomalous, is still too new and exper-
imental to allow of the formulation of any but the most general
principles’.152
What these documents show is that the ‘anomaly’ of India’s
international status was recognised and debated at the time, in
exactly these terms. The analysis of the scalar dynamics of this
anomaly has exposed some of the ways in which the national and
the international were interacting in the interwar period. In terms
of imperial interactions, India (‘inside out’) had a degree of self-
government and unity at the international level, in the League of
Nations, that it did not possess at the national level, in the subcon-
tinent. This was in part a product of governmental exceptionalism,
but it was also a product of political philosophical debates about
the status of ‘India’ and of anti-colonial commentaries on India’s
treatment in the international sphere. In terms of colonial in-
teractions, India (‘outside in’) was exposed as lacking territorial
unity through debates about the quasi-sovereignty of the Princely
States, which trafﬁcking inwomen and children exposed due to its
capillary ability to course between the ﬁssures between Princely
and British India.153
Examining the Indian international anomaly through this
scalar lens provides a series of insights into a particular sover-
eignty regime of colonialism. India’s external engagement with
the League, coordinated through New Delhi, London and Geneva,
saw sovereignty being deployed in terms of representation
(diplomatic silencing), government (administering exception-
alism), theory (political philosophies of statehood) and politics
(anti-colonialism). The internal questions provoked by the Lea-
gue were raised between New Delhi and provincial and regional
cities, which saw sovereignty debated in terms of territory
(British and Princely India), theory (quasi-sovereignty), govern-
ment (indirect rule), representation (the Chamber of Princes)
and contract (international conventions regarding trafﬁcking).
The diversity of these sites and techniques prove that the in-
ternational was not a sphere with semi-naturalistic processes of
government, capital or civilisation. It was a network of sites and
names that took in cities and people across the globe, though not
on terms of equality, fraternity or liberty. Rather, it produced
anomalies in imperial relations and colonial territory that forced
novel experiments across the performative range of sovereignty,
the traces of which give us, I hope, some tentative and speciﬁc
answers to the more general question: where was the
international?volved some powers to elected Indian Ministers in the provinces but retained British
holding open above all of the alternative law or politics is in my opinion typical of
al law (note 47), 35.
(note 34).
possibly contributed to, their forcible integration into postcolonial federal India. See
History Review 46 (2009) 427e456.
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